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Abstract 
The current work seeks to ascertain whether rulings on dismissal cases issued by 
labour courts in Spain are influenced by whether incumbent judges are acting alone 
in their own court or sharing duties with other judges such as replacement judges, 
support judges or incumbent judges from other courts. In the approach used, more 
than one judge acting in a court is considered to be a treatment, and an analysis is 
conducted into the effect said treatment has had on the percentage of cases in which 
the judge has found in favour of the dismissed worker. The data used in the research 
are taken from the information recorded at court level provided by the statistics 
kept by the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary. A total of 2,888 observations 
were available, corresponding to the period spanning 2004 to 2012, and the 
information is the result of constructing a data panel from all the labour courts in 
Spain. As regards the findings, the percentage of cases ruled in favour of workers 
increases in line with the unemployment rate. More cases are also ruled in favour of 
workers during the crisis and in areas where the construction and industrial sector 
play a greater role. With regard to treatment as the central analysis variable, it may 
be concluded that there is a significant positive impact on the number of dismissal 
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The present work seeks to ascertain whether decisions on dismissal cases in 
Spanish labour courts are influenced by whether incumbent judges are acting 
alone in their own court or sharing tasks with other colleagues, such as 
replacement judges, support judges or incumbent judges from other courts. 
The present paper thus contributes to an emerging economic literature, 
framed within the law and economics (L&E) and labour economics (LE), and 
which explores the determinants driving the decisions taken in dismissal 
cases by labour court judges in Spain. Relevant works related to this issue 
include Jimeno et al. (2015), and Martín-Román et al. (2013, 2015). 
 
One aspect dealt with in this literature concerns whether the various 
types of judge display a differing tendency to rule in favour of the worker in 
dismissal cases. The study by Martín-Román et al. (2013) reports that, on 
average, replacement judges tended to rule more in favour of the worker, 
particularly during the years of economic crisis (greater dispersion was also 
reported in their decisions). In the study by Martín-Román et al. (2015), 
conducted using spatial econometrics techniques, the conclusion was that 
judges dealing with labour jurisdiction cases were influenced by the 
decisions taken by their colleagues acting in nearby courts. The authors claim 
that such behaviour highlights the existence of “peer effects” in Spanish 
labour courts or, to use their own words, an “emulation effect”. 
 
The present research seeks to gain further insights into the matter in 
two respects. Firstly, the question of peer influence on judges’ decisions in 
dismissal cases is addressed in depth. For this purpose, “treatment”, or the 
sharing of the court with other colleagues is considered, and a comparison is 
drawn between how “treated” judges act and how other judges who issue 
rulings in courts free from the influence of their colleagues (control group) 
also act. After demonstrating that said influence is statistically significant, we 
undertake to measure it, given that it has potentially important implications 
for economic policy. 
 
Secondly, we also aim to explore the “mechanism” through which said 
peer influence on incumbent judges’ decisions comes about. More 
specifically, we examine whether it is a question of pure “peer effects”, by 
comparing the decisions of judges who act alone with those who share courts 
with support judges or incumbent judges from other courts (or other 
professional judges), or whether it is a matter of “quasi-peer effects”, when 
comparing the decisions of judges working alone with those of judges 
working with replacements in their same court during the same year.  
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There are several reasons for making this distinction1 . Firstly, 
replacement judges are not professional judges whereas the rest are. By 
professional judges we refer to those civil servants that have passed an 
extremely hard public examination, have a secure job position and moreover 
enjoy a high reputation. Otherwise, by replacement judges we refer to those 
judges who only have a fixed-term contract. They can be removed from their 
job position easily and do not have the same reputational level than the 
professional judges. Secondly, replacement judges do not act at the same time 
as incumbent judges whereas the rest may. This would lead to the influence 
between work colleagues being more intense amongst incumbent judges and 
other professional judges than amongst incumbent judges and replacement 
judges2. This distinction proves particularly important at a time when major 
judicial reforms are taking place such as restricting the number of cases that 
can be dealt with by replacement judges. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, a 
short comment is provided on the relevant institutional aspects. Section 3 
reviews the references related to the current work. Section 4 describes the 
database used in the research. Section 5 explains the econometric 
methodology employed. Section 6 shows the results obtained. Finally, section 
7 sums up the main conclusions to emerge from the work. 
 
 
2. Institutional framework  
 
One initial aspect to be taken into account from an institutional standpoint is 
the procedure followed when cases are handled in labour courts. Said 
procedure is reflected in the lower part of the diagram shown in Figure 1. 
The first step involves the intervention of the legal secretary whose task it is 
to convene the parties in public audience in an effort to secure conciliation. 
Once this step has concluded without a compromise between the two parties 
having been reached, these go to court and the magistrate is responsible for 
taking a decision on the matter by ruling either in favour or against. During 
this process, there is always the possibility that the complainant may 
withdraw (tacitly or expressly) as a result of which the judge cannot take a 
decision. Other situations which may give rise to non-issuance of a ruling are 
when there are formal defects, missing documents, or when the court in 
which the claim has been brought declines jurisdiction, etc. 
 
                                                          
1 As well as those mentioned, it could be added that the work of Martín-Román et al. (2013) 
reports that incumbent judges and replacement judges in labour courts behave differently. 
2 There is a third reason for separating our database into these two groups of non-incumbent 
judges, although it is strictly statistical: the structure and size of our database recommends 
such a distinction (the following section deals with this issue in greater detail). 
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Figure 1: Dismissal procedure in the Spanish legal system 
 
Source: Authors’ own based on Frick et al (2012). 
 
A second issue to be considered is the matters dealt with in labour 
courts. The General Council of the Spanish Judiciary establishes a 
classification which remained in force until 2011, comprising the following: 
 Dismissal cases: within this first group, it should be borne in mind 
that, in application of Spanish legislation, whenever a worker is 
dismissed, said conflict may previously and voluntarily be resolved by 
both worker and employer going to the Mediation, Arbitration and 
Conciliation Unit (MAC Units). In Spain, this unit is an extrajudicial 
body for settling disputes and is found in each region. If worker and 
employer are unable to reach a compromise through the MAC unit, the 
worker may proceed with the complaint by going to a labour court. 
The full procedure is set out in Figure 1. 
 Collective labour disputes: this covers cases that affect the interests of 
a general group of workers taken as a whole or in abstract terms. Said 
cases generally refer to the application or interpretation of a rule, a 
collective wage agreement, or a company decision or practice. Also 
dealt with here are cases involving disputes over collective wage 
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agreements. They may be initiated by trade unions, business 
associations, and business people as well as by the legal 
representatives of trade unions or workers in the case of company or 
workplace conflicts. 
 Matters concerning payments: covering conflicts related to wages and 
salaries, bonuses, extra payments, etc. 
 Social Security issues: related to complaints concerning issues such as 
affiliation, contribution, benefits, workplace accidents and work-
related illnesses, etc. 
 Other matters: concerning issues such as holidays, specific working 
conditions, as well as those in which the complainant may be the 
labour inspectorate service.  
 
In addition to the above, since 2012 the statistics also distinguish a 
further three types of case which concern workplace accidents, contesting 
decisions, and fundamental rights. Nevertheless, and in agreement with the 
information provided by General Council of the Spanish Judiciary (Spanish 
acronym – CGPJ) staff, only in dismissal cases it is clear that the decision 
always benefits the worker (there is also a high percentage in cases that deal 
with payments). This is why it is this type of case that will be the focus of 
attention in the subsequent empirical analysis. 
 
With regard to dismissal cases, the possible effects of the two labour 
reform policies implemented in 20103 and 20124 should be taken into 
account. The main changes introduced in the 2010 reform involved extending 
the conditions under which dismissal for economic reasons is applicable, and 
reversing the burden of proof (it is now the employees who are obliged to 
show evidence of unfair dismissal). For its part, the 2012 reform simplified 
the concept of dismissal for economic reasons5 and did away with salaries 
paid pending a court decision even if workers were finally reinstated. Said 
changes in the legislative framework may have influenced the number and 
nature of the cases that end up in labour courts and should be taken into 
account when making the estimation. 
 
The final point that needs to be made clear from a legal standpoint 
concerns which judges may act in the court. This will allow for proper 
identification of treatment. In this regard, and as shall be made clear over the 
coming paragraphs, two different scenarios will be explored. The first one 
seeks to show the influence of professional judges when they may be sharing 
the same court as is used by an incumbent judge. The second reflects the 
                                                          
3
Royal Decree-Law 10/2010, of 16 June, applying urgent measures for labour market reform and Law 
35/2010, of 17 September applying urgent measures for labour market reform.  
4
Royal Decree Law 3/2012, of 10 February, applying urgent measures for labour market reform and 
Law 3/2012, of 6 July, applying urgent measures for labour market reform. 
5
It is sufficient for a firm’s revenue or sales to be less than for the same quarter of the previous year. 
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effect of replacement judges or replacement magistrates, who are not 
professional judges and who are not acting in the court at the same time. 
 
Organic Law 6/1985, of 1 July, of the General Council of the Spanish 
Judiciary, in its consolidated text dated 28 April 2015 (Art. 216 bis) states 
that “When an exceptional delay or backlog of cases in a certain court cannot 
be solved by augmenting staff numbers in the judicial office or by issuing a 
temporary exemption on the assigned number of cases set out under Art. 
167.1, the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary may adopt exceptional 
legal support measures consisting of assigning incumbent judges and 
magistrates from other legal bodies…”. Point 3 of the same article also lays 
down that “support judges may be allocated in the following order; regionally 
appointed judges, as referred to under Art. 347 bis, judges awaiting allocation 
of a post, as set out under Art. 308.2, judges undertaking practical training, as 
set out under Art. 307.2 and, in exceptional circumstances, replacement 
judges and replacement magistrates”. 
 
In application of the above, the distinction between the two kinds of 
judges who may share a court with the incumbent judge seems clear. On the 
one side would be the replacement judges, who are not professional judges, 
and who tend to be charged with covering incumbent judge’s vacations 
together with those who do not normally act. There are also other judges 
(assigned from the same region, incumbent judges from other courts and 
others support professional judges) who are indeed professional judges and 
who may share the court with the incumbent judge. It is this second group 
who, in our view, may most influence the decisions made by incumbent 
judges and who may therefore be linked to the pure “peer effect”. In the case 
of replacement judges, the link is different and may be determined by 
strategic behaviour when choosing cases or by information problems arising 
when more than one judge may have been involved in dealing with the same 
case. We will refer to this second effect as a “quasi-peer effect”. 
 
3. The Current Situation 
 
3.1. The psychology, sociology, economics and behaviour of judges 
Court rulings should be based solely on the objective features of each case. 
The well-known representation of justice wearing a blindfold over her eyes 
symbolises this idea. And, yet those responsible for delivering justice, namely 
the judges, are only human beings. It is for this very reason that justice itself 
becomes a social phenomenon and, as such, has attracted the attention of 
social researchers. As a result, research fields such as sociology, psychology 
or economics have sought to gain insights into which factors might shape the 
decisions taken by judges in the various jurisdictions (Posner, 2008; 
Danziger et al., 2011). 




One example of a study carried out along this line from the field of 
sociology is that by Manzanos (2004). Although the effects of the factors 
which impact on legal decisions are not quantified through any statistical 
analysis, said article does provide a list thereof. The author classifies them in 
different categories: social and professional factors (stemming from their 
professionalisation); ideological, religious and cultural factors; subjective 
factors such as age, gender or marital status or educational background; 
factors linked to media pressure or even related to the very people involved 
in the case in hand. 
 
From an interdisciplinary standpoint, spanning the fields of 
psychology and sociology, the work of Bornstein and Miller (2009) places the 
emphasis on the role played by the judge’s religion (Jewish, Catholic or 
Protestant) in the rulings they make. They conclude that religion does indeed 
shape the decisions reached and that it is a further factor to be taken into 
account when seeking to understand and predict judges’ decisions. 
 
Stemming from the field of psychology, although more along the line 
of economic analysis, is the field of behavioural economics. After the 
publication of Tversky and Kahneman’s seminal work (1974) on the effect of 
cognitive rules in decision making, said approach has been applied to a wide 
array of social issues. Within the sphere that concerns us here, it can be said 
that it opens up a line of research which explores the psychological and 
socioeconomic factors that affect legal rulings. In this regard, an exposition of 
how cognitive bias can influence judges’ decisions can be found in Muñoz 
Aranguren (2011). 
 
Nevertheless, the list of potential factors that can shape judges’ 
decisions is quite long. One work which explores the various connections 
between psychology and behavioural economics at a descriptive level is 
Baum (2010). From the field of L&E, Posner (2005) states that judges 
maximise their own utility function and therefore respond to incentives and 
restrictions. The author also reports differing incentives depending on the 
type of judge making the ruling. The article by Yoon (2006) examines  judges’ 
decisions to retire and concludes that the financial incentives are extremely 
important if this is to be understood properly beyond mere political and 
institutional reasons. This raises the issue of whether judges might also be 
acting taking into account economic incentives when working. One of the 
leading experts in the analysis of the economics of risk and uncertainty, Kip 
Viscusi, also explores legal decisions from said standpoint. In his work, 
Viscusi (1999) finds empirical evidence that judges display patterns of bias 
when estimating risks and placing an economic value on human life. Although 
judges tend to be more coherent in their decisions than juries and society as a 
whole, said author advocates seeking expert advice in complex cases 
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involving risk evaluation. Rachlinski (1996) contrasts the use of the theory of 
expected utility with the standard theoretical framework of behavioural 
economics in an effort to understand litigation. Whilst not rejecting use of the 
theory of expected utility for understanding major trends, he considers 
behavioural economics to be more suited to analysing certain details, and 
feels that L&E could benefit greatly from it. 
 
3.2. L&E and labour courts 
It is precisely in this field of L&E where the work of Cooter and 
Rubinfeld (1989) is to be found. This landmark article explains the way in 
which L&E focuses on analysing how courts function. As the authors 
themselves point out, economic models, with their notion of balance in the 
interaction of individuals who pursue their own interest, provide a reference 
which helps understand the results to come out of said courts. Nevertheless, 
they also urge further research into judges’ motivations. Two examples of 
such research are the works of Brennan et al. (2009a, 2009b). Using probit 
regressions, they analyse how different macroeconomic variables affect 
judicial decisions in United States courts. A work which is closer to the type 
of court studied in the present paper is that of Burguess et al. (2001). Said 
article seeks to find an explanation for the increase in the number of cases 
dealt with in what are the equivalent of labour courts in the United States. 
They conclude that economic variables (likelihood of winning, the economic 
worth of winning …) play an important role when understanding how the 
cases to reach the courts have evolved. 
 
Although dismissals form only one part of the cases analysed in the 
work of Burguess et al. (2001), there is specific literature to be found 
between L&E and LE which addresses the issue of how labour courts function 
with regard to dismissal cases, as well as the determining factors in labour 
court rulings. As can be seen from Figure 1, it is clear that prior to reaching 
the final phase where the judge makes a decision, a dismissal case passes 
through a number of different stages (at any of which it may indeed 
conclude). By way of an example, one group of works which could be 
highlighted here examines what might be termed the “prior stage” to the 
labour court judge’s decision. Some of the topics explored in said works 
include determining severance payments for dismissal (Malo, 2000; 2001)6, 
the relation between the cost of dismissal and the gap created in the 
legislation governing severance payments in cases of “fair” (lawful) and 
“unfair” (unlawful) dismissal (Galdón-Sánchez and Güell, 2000), the 
theoretical effect of conflicts on unemployment in the matter of dismissals 
(Galdón-Sánchez and Güell, 2003) or a comparison between the legal 
                                                          
6 In the former work, the author models the determinants of severance pay for dismissal in 
Spain through negotiation prior to any trial. In the second, the main interest lies in modelling 
severance payments in cases of collective dismissals. 
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frameworks of the United States and Europe and their theoretical effects on 
severance payments for dismissal (Malo and Pérez, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the present research focuses mainly on the latter part of 
the process summed up in Figure 1: the judge’s decision. These judicial 
decisions have also attracted a certain amount of attention from researchers. 
Analysis has centred mainly on whether labour court judges are sensitive to 
the socioeconomic environment around them when taking their decisions, 
and, in particular, whether the business cycle (reflected principally in the 
unemployment rate) shapes their decisions. One of the most influential 
articles in this area is that of Ichino et al. (2003)7. The authors believe that 
when a dismissal case reaches the courts, the only determining factor in the 
judge’s decision should be whether the worker’s conduct in his/her 
workplace was proper or not. However, using a database from an Italian bank 
together with macroeconomic information, they find that local labour market 
conditions influence the ruling issued in the courts. More specifically, they 
find that when unemployment rises, so does the likelihood that a worker will 
be awarded a decision favourable to their interests8. The specific relation is: a 
one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate means that the 
likelihood of the firm winning the case drops by 2.5 percentage points. 
 
Contrastingly, using microdata for the United Kingdom in 1992, the 
study by Marinescu (2011) found that increases in both the unemployment 
rate and in company bankruptcies tended to reduce the likelihood of judges 
ruling in favour of dismissed workers. The author estimates that a one 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate reduces said likelihood 
by seven percentage points. The same author had found empirical evidence 
pointing in a similar direction in a previous study using French data 
(Marinescu, 2003)9. 
 
The empirical evidence found for the case of Spain seems to more 
closely resemble the situation in Italy reflected in Ichino et al. (2003) than 
the cases seen in Marinescu (2003, 2011). The study by Mora (2005), using 
an econometric static panel method and taking Spanish regions as units, finds 
that a 1% rise in the unemployment rate leads to a 14% increase in the 
number of cases won by workers in dismissal suits in courts, which points to 
a significantly high elasticity indeed. In a subsequent study (Mora, 2006), the 
same author, adopting a dynamic panel approach, confirms the previously 
reported contra-cyclical behaviour in court decisions favouring workers. A 
                                                          
7 These authors base their work on a previous study by Macis (2001). 
8 This finding concurs with that of Donohue and Siegelman (1991), who claim that workers 
tend to make greater use of the legal system during periods of economic downturn if their 
job is at risk. 
9 The author justifies this finding drawing on experimental evidence from the work of Farber 
and Bazerman (1986). For the case of the United States, these latter authors find that in 
arbitration proceedings concerning wage rises, the arbitrator tends towards the position of 
the firm when the latter is in a precarious financial situation. 
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more recent study which is part of a wider-ranging analysis also estimating 
the contra-cyclical nature of judges’ decisions in labour courts in dismissal 
cases is that of Martín-Román et al. (2013). Said article includes some years 
from the recent major recession, since it analyses the period covering 2004 
to 2011. Using a panel, which takes Spanish provinces as units, they conclude 
that the reported contra-cyclical behaviour proves far more evident in the 
case of incumbent judges than replacement judges. In the case of incumbent 
judges, the likelihood of an appeal against dismissal being ruled in favour of 
workers increases by between 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points for each point 
that the unemployment rate rises10.  
 
A very recent study which examines the cyclical sensitivity of court 
decisions in Spanish labour courts, also within the framework of a wider 
analysis, is Jimeno et al. (2015). In the study, the authors explore whether the 
recent labour reforms of 2010 and 2012, mentioned in the section dealing 
with legislation, have had any impact on the percentage of cases in which 
labour courts rule in favour of the workers. They find a link between the 
unemployment rate in the province in which the court is located and the 
number of cases ruled in favour of the worker, which is lower after reforms 
than in the previous period. 
 
3.3. “Peer effects” or “quasi-peer effects” 
The present work seeks to ascertain whether labour court judges are 
influenced by the social environment in which they work, and not merely in 
terms of the unemployment rate in the area. In this regard, the paper aims to 
further the line of research initiated in Martín-Román et al. (2015), an article 
which pointed to the existence of “peer effects” in Spanish labour courts11. 
Nevertheless, the argument followed here is quite different. We draw on the 
fact that incumbent judges may share their court over the course of the year 
with other colleagues such as replacement judges or support judges. As this 
                                                          
10 Two studies to explore other effects which the business cycle has on labour courts in Spain 
are those of García-Martínez and Malo (2007) and Frick et al. (2012). The former examines 
how the business cycle affects companies’ strategic use of individual dismissals compared to 
collective dismissals in an effort to adjust the workforce. In the latter, macro panel 
regressions are performed with the 17 Spanish regions and the 11 German states as units. 
The main finding to emerge is that when the business cycle is at a low point workers are 
more prone to use the labour courts when dismissed (as well as in cases concerning salary 
disputes). In a similar vein, Berger and Neugart (2011) also report a positive link between 
the legal activity of German labour courts and unemployment. 
11 In order to delve more deeply into the definition of “peer effects”, three important 
references are Manski (1993, 2000) and Dietz (2002), who explain the various types of 
social effects or proximity effect that might exist. Strictly speaking, the real “peer effects” 
correspond to the endogenous effects in Manski’s classification. This corresponds to the 
“emulation effect” defined in Martín-Román et al. (2015). Correlated and exogenous effects 
are also social effects although their rationale differs somewhat. A detailed explanation of 
how the three types of proximity effects can operate in Spanish labour courts can also be 
found in Martin-Román et al. (2015). 
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information is available in microdata at the individual court level that we use 
in the empirical section, we are able to determine whether incumbent judges, 
who are the only ones acting in their court (in other words, with no “peer” 
sharing the court with them) behave differently to incumbent judges who 
share tasks during the year with other colleagues. 
 
Following Manski (1993, 2000) and Dietz (2002), there are social 
interactions and proximity effects which might be influencing judicial 
decisions. Said influence is referred to as the “emulation effect” in Martín-
Román et al. (2015), and would reflect the fact that the decisions taken by 
colleagues close by would affect those taken by the judges themselves. It 
would seem logical to assume that if courts are influenced by what happens 
in other neighbouring courts then said influence would be even more evident 
between judges sharing the same court. Manski (1993) identifies this 
interaction as endogenous effects and Dietz (2002) as pure “peer effects”. 
Justification for such behaviour would lie in the psychological cost for a judge 
of making greatly different decisions to those being taken by other 
magistrates with whom they interact.  
 
A second point to be taken into account is the sense of the expected 
effect of this interaction. In our view, the fact that “peer effects” exist should 
lead to an increase in the number of sentences ruling in favour of the worker. 
The reason underlying this is that, in cases where the decisions are not so 
clear, judges who are not acting alone will aim to follow the most socially 
accepted behaviour. This will be reflected in ruling in favour of the worker, 
since this situation is repeated in over 70 % of cases. 
 
One final point to be borne in mind is the type of judge who is 
interacting with the incumbent judge of the court. We feel that not all the 
incumbent judge’s colleagues are the same and that nor do they influence the 
judge in the same manner. Basically, we consider whether the judge with 
whom the incumbent judge is sharing the court is a replacement judge or 
whether they belong to any of the other categories (support judge, 
incumbent judge from another court …).  
 
There are several reasons for making this distinction12. Firstly, 
replacement judges are not professional judges whereas the rest are. The 
difference between a professional judge and one who is not is very important 
in Spain. The latter basically have a degree in law and have gained approval 
to sit as judges from the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary. In contrast, 
a professional judge must pass much harder public examinations to become a 
qualified judge (within the civil service). The difference in terms of prestige 
between the two kinds of judge is enormous. It is also common for 
                                                          
12 As well as those mentioned, it could be added that the work of Martín-Román et al. (2013) 
reports that incumbent judges and replacement judges in labour courts behave differently. 
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professional judges to show tremendous respect for one another, and for 
them to see replacement judges as colleagues who belong to a lower status. 
Secondly, replacement judges do not act at the same time as incumbent 
judges whereas the rest may. This would lead to the influence between work 
colleagues being more intense amongst incumbent judges and other 
professional judges than amongst incumbent judges and replacement 
judges13. 
 
For these two reasons, we feel that there are “peer effects” when 
incumbent judges interact with colleagues who are professional judges like 
themselves, and we refer to “quasi-peer effects” when speaking of the 
interaction between the incumbent judges of the court and replacement 
judges. Following on from the above paragraph, our “a priori” hypothesis is 
that “peer effects” should be more powerful than “quasi-peer effects”. The 
greater mutual respect shown between those who are (truly) equals, added 
to the greater concurrence both in terms of time and space when issuing 




The data used in this study are taken from the statistics drawn up by the 
General Council of the Spanish Judiciary concerning cases dealt with in 
Spanish labour courts by type of judge. For the purposes of this study, 2,888 
data corresponding to the period between 2004 and 201214 were available, 
bearing in mind that the number of courts grew from 299 in 2004 to 341 in 
2012. In all instances, information is available concerning the nature of the 
case in question, the type of judge handling the case and the decision taken 
(whether upholding or rejecting the claim). Using this database, courts where 
the number of cases dealt with is below ten have been removed so as to avoid 
extreme situations. As a result, the available data come to 2,809.  
 
The target variable, namely the percentage of dismissal cases ruled in 
favour of workers by incumbent judges in each court, can now be 
constructed, and the differences in said percentage, depending on which 
judges have been acting in the same court as the incumbent judge, can be 
analysed. Given this objective, one initial consideration would be to try to 
pinpoint whether there are any differences from a purely descriptive 
standpoint. Table 1 thus shows the percentage of dismissal cases ruled in 
favour of workers by the incumbent judges depending on whether they were 
                                                          
13 There is a third reason for separating our database into these two groups of non-
incumbent judges, although it is strictly statistical: the structure and size of our database 
recommends such a distinction (the following section deals with this issue in greater detail). 
14 Although information is available for before 2004, it cannot be used since it is not broken 
down into type of judge. 
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the only ones acting in the court or whether the court was being shared with 
other judges. In addition, a distinction is also drawn between whether the 
other judge is only a replacement judge or whether any other type of judge is 
present. 
 
The data displayed in Table 1 highlight the increase, in aggregate 
terms, of the percentage of cases ruled in favour of workers by incumbent 
judges when they are sharing the court with another judge. The increase is 
over one percentage point when those who are acting in the same court are 
only replacement judges, yet is almost three points when another type of 
judge is acting in the same court. These results are quite robust for the whole 
period, with two exceptions. In 2010 and 2011, courts in which there were 
only incumbent judges evidence a greater percentage of dismissal cases ruled 
in favour of workers than the rest. The other exception occurs in 2004 and 
2006 where the percentage of cases ruled in favour of workers was greater 
when incumbent judges were only sharing the court with replacement judges 
rather than with other kinds of judges. An upward trend can also be seen in 
the number of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers over time, which 
would seem to point to a greater tendency to rule in favour of workers during 
an economic downturn or crisis. Finally, to substantiate these differences, 
tests for equality of means were carried out, comparing the percentage of 
dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers by incumbent judges acting alone 
with those acting with the two groups of reference judges. In both instances, 
equality is rejected (for a significance level of 1% when incumbent judges act 
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Table 1. Percentage of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers by incumbent judges 
by year and type of judge sharing each court 
Year Only incumbent 
Incumbent and 
replacement 
Incumbent and others 
 
Percentage Courts Percentage Courts Percentage Courts 
2004 69.6% 60 73.2% 135 69.1% 10 
2005 69.1% 64 70.4% 110 74.7% 20 
2006 68.6% 81 71.5% 111 69.5% 29 
2007 70.0% 82 70.1% 117 72.5% 23 
2008 75.1% 88 75.6% 135 77.4% 20 
2009 75.4% 36 76.3% 57 79.1% 60 
2010 75.4% 32 72.4% 69 74.8% 52 
2011 74.1% 47 72.4% 128 73.5% 17 
2012 75.0% 52 75.4% 189 75.4% 9 
Total 72.0% 542 73.1% 1051 74.9% 240 
Source: Authors’ own based on CGPJ data. 
 
Nevertheless, although relevant, the analysis of the mean values is 
partial and may be masking part of the phenomenon. For this reason, it 
proves enlightening to provide a representation of the distribution of the 
percentage of cases ruled in favour of workers amongst the various courts 
using a Kernel. Figure 2 displays the percentage of dismissal cases ruled in 
favour of workers depending on whether only the incumbent judge is acting 
in the court or whether they are sharing with another judge. It can be seen 
that when incumbent judges do not act alone in the court, there is a 
displacement to the right in the distribution of cases ruled in favour of 
workers. Said displacement is more noticeable when the judges sharing the 
court with the incumbent judge are not replacement judges. This result 
means that there is a greater concentration of courts with higher rates of 
dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers when more judges are acting. Put 
differently, there is a higher concentration of courts with low percentages of 
cases ruled in favour of workers when sentences in dismissal cases are only 
passed by the court’s incumbent judge. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of the percentage of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers 
by type of judge in each court 
 
Source: Authors’ own based on CGPJ data. 
 
In order to endow the descriptive analysis with greater robustness, a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was conducted. The aim was to evidence the 
existence of significant differences in the distributions of the dependent 
variable depending on the type of judge acting in each court. The results to 
emerge from the test again show that the distributions of the percentage of 
cases ruled in favour of workers differ between courts where sentences are 
only issued by incumbent judges and when the latter share the court with 
other judges16. 
 
From a merely descriptive standpoint, preliminary analysis would 
seem to indicate a positive effect of sharing the court on the percentage of 
dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers. Furthermore, there also seems to 
be a greater effect if incumbent judges share the court with other 
professional judges than when they do so with replacement judges or 
replacement magistrates. In the previously defined terms, a “peer effect” 
emerges which is noticeably higher than the “quasi-peer effect”. 
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As already explained, the present work seeks to measure the possibility that 
an incumbent judge’s decision in a dismissal case in a court (in a given year) 
vis-à-vis the likelihood of ruling in favour of the worker may be affected by 
the decisions taken by other judges acting in the same court. With this 
purpose in mind, more than one judge working in a court is considered to be 
treatment, and an analysis is made of the effect said treatment has on the 
percentage of cases in which the incumbent judge rules in favour of the 
dismissed worker. 
 
Given that we are dealing with observational data, the fact that 
treatment exists cannot (previously) be influenced. As a result, there might 
be variables impacting simultaneously both on the result and on the fact that 
there is more than one judge acting in a given court. Moreover, and to the 
extent that some of these variables are unknown, there might be a problem of 
endogeneity which would need to be corrected by econometric techniques. 
 
The STATA software used (STATA Corp., 2013) offers several 
procedures to gauge the effect of a given treatment, although the vast 
majority are based on the assumption of independence between the result of 
the target variable and the fact that it is subject to treatment. Of the two 
commands that allow endogeneity to be dealt with, the only one which 
adapts to the requirements of the present paper is ETREGRESS, which is used 
for linear models where the case being treated is modelled through a normal 
distribution (the other command, ETPOISSON, is designed for count variables 
with whole positive values). Cerulli (2014) introduces a development in this 
method with a new program (IVTREATREG). This command corrects two 
limitations: on the one hand, the model is not restricted to complying with 
error normality and, on the other, calculating the heterogeneous effects on 
both the treated and non-treated population proves possible. 
 
From a purely statistical viewpoint, the goal of this paper is to explore 
the effect of a treatment   on a target variable  . Also taken into account is 
the fact that this treatment is not random and that it depends on some kind of 
specification. Otherwise, if it is assumed that   equals   when there is no 
treatment, and   otherwise, we will also have two different target values,    if 
    and    when    .  
 
The ultimate goal this method pursues is to calculate the average 
treatment effect (ATE) which is, at the same time, the composition of the 
mean effect on those that are both treated (ATET) and not treated (ATENT), 
in agreement with the following expressions: 
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Since the available data are observational, it is impossible to know for 
a given court what the percentage is of cases ruled in favour of workers when 
said court is treated and when it is not. Nevertheless, it does prove possible 
to pinpoint the  variables which might be having an impact both on the 
result and on the treatment. Thus, estimated values can be obtained for the 
parameters of interest conditioned by the  , in agreement with the following 
expressions: 
 
     )            ) 
 
      )             ,  ) 
 
       )             ,  ) 
 
In more formal terms, the treatment effect is estimated through two 
equations, one for the target variable and another for endogenous treatment. 
 
                           ,   
 
      )          
 
   
                                 
                                          
  
 
In order to conduct such an estimation, it is necessary to include an 
additional scenario which ensures the stability of the treatment effect. This 
scenario indicates that the effect of treatment on a unit does not have an 
impact on the results of the rest (Rubin, 1978; Cox 1958). The final step 
involves specifying a given model (linear probability or probit) for treatment 






6.1. The Effect of Treatment 
The descriptive analysis has highlighted that the percentage of dismissal 
cases ruled in favour of workers by the incumbent judges differs depending 
on whether they are acting alone or sharing the court with other judges. 
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Nevertheless, it is impossible to know whether this difference is caused by a 
composition effect of the cases, by the direct effect of different types of judge 
coinciding in the same court, or by unobservable factors which affect the two 
variables. In order to distinguish between these explanations, the procedure 
followed is the one described in the methodological section based on 
analysing the effect of a treatment on a dependent variable or target variable. 
 
As already mentioned earlier, the variable used in this work is the 
percentage of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers by the incumbent 
judge of a court, and treatment involves more judges acting at the same time 
as the incumbent judge in a single court. Furthermore, there may be two 
kinds of treatment, one in which the other judges are only replacement 
judges and another in which the incumbent judge is sharing the court with 
another type of judge other than a replacement judge. There are also 
assumed to be unobservable variables that affect both the fact that treatment 
exists as well as the dependent variable, and that there is also endogeneity in 
the model. As a result, what must first be determined is which variables 
should be included as explanatory of the target variable, and which might 
serve as a non-endogenous instrument for treatment. 
 
From a legal standpoint, the percentage of cases ruled in favour of 
workers by each judge should only be influenced by purely legal 
considerations. In this regard, the main core of explanatory variables should 
consist of those variables which might be influencing the type of case 
reaching each court. As a result, variables reflecting the composition of each 
area’s workforce have been included, both in terms of age as well as the field 
in which they are employed. Six variables are used, three reflecting the 
percentage of people working in the province aged between 20 and 24 years 
old, 25 and 54 years old, and those over 55, and a further three which analyse 
the percentage of those working in industry, construction, and agriculture. 
Control variables relating to the composition of the various types of case are 
also included. Specifically, there are three variables which measure the 
percentage of cases concerning dismissals, payments, and collective wage 
agreements in each court. Temporal control variables are also included with 
a dummy for each year studied (2004 is used as the reference). The aim is to 
reflect the national cyclical effects and the influence of legislative changes 
such as the 2010 and 2012 labour reforms. Finally, the local unemployment 
rate is added for two reasons; on the one hand to show the provincial 
variability of the business cycle, and on the other to help control the 
composition of the various cases. 
 
As regards treatment, several alternatives are considered for how to 
instrument it. First, a dummy is used, reflecting whether there is a change of 
judge in a given court and year. The idea behind this variable is that insofar 
as a court lacks stability in terms of having a regular incumbent judge, the 
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more likely it is that other judges will be acting. Secondly, another variable is 
used to indicate whether, as an initial reference of its size, it is a single court 
within the province. A further variable has also been used to reflect the 
workload of the court in terms of the number of cases17. It would seem logical 
to assume that courts in which there are more cases being dealt with by the 
incumbent judges are less likely to have other judges working in them at the 
same time. Finally, a model was also posited in which regional dummies are 
included to reflect possible effects linked to the influence of the Supreme 
Court of Justice in the region. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of estimating the percentage of cases 
ruled in favour of workers in the two treatments analysed. In Table 2, 
treatment indicates that various judges are acting at the same time, 
specifically professional judges who are not replacement judges. In Table 3, 
treatment is felt to be when in the same court, together with the incumbent 
judges, the only judges acting are replacement judges or replacement 
magistrates. The first column reflects the specification that does not 
introduce treatment of heteroskedasticity and therefore does not reflect any 
different effect of treatment for treated and non-treated instances. The 
following two columns include specifications for heteroskedasticity and 
reflect changes in how treatment is instrumented. Finally, the last column 
modifies the estimation method of the more comprehensive specification and 
uses the Heckman method rather than two-stage estimation (probit for 
treatment and two-stage least squares for the target variable) of all the 
previous specifications. 
 
The first block of variables refers to all those included as explanatory 
variables of the decision taken. The second block reflects the instrumental 
variables used to correct the endogeneity of treatment. The third block 
includes the estimations of the mean effect of treatment and when this is 
broken down into the effect on those treated and not treated. In the 
estimations corresponding to specifications II, III and IV, variables for the 
treatment of heteroskedasticity have been included and are those which 
allow the heterogeneous effects of treatment to be obtained and a distinction 
to be drawn between the effect of treatment on those treated and those not 
treated. The variables reflecting said heteroskedasticity are a dummy that 
indicates whether there has been a change of judge in the court during the 
course of the year, which would point to variability in the percentage of cases 
ruled in favour of workers depending on the judge, and the other variable, 
which is the number of dismissal cases dealt with by the incumbent judges in 
each court (compared to other types of case). This latter variable is included 
                                                          
17 García and Rosales (2010) and Rosales (2008) consider workload and backlog in courts to be 
determining factors in judicial output. 
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because differences have been observed in the dispersion of the percentage 
of cases ruled in favour of workers depending on the cases dealt with18. 
 
In light of the results presented in Table 2, the percentage of dismissal 
cases ruled in favour of workers by incumbent judges is seen to be almost ten 
percentage points higher when other professional judges are acting in the 
same court. This is a considerable figure since, if one bears in mind that the 
mean number of cases ruled in favour of workers is around 70%, it points to 
an increase of some 14%. Further, the difference is significantly higher than 
is observed in the descriptive analysis, where no type of control is used. The 
result is the same over the four models analysed, regardless of whether there 
is heteroskedasticity of the instruments used or even when the estimation 
method is changed. One initial conclusion would therefore be the existence of 
a strong “peer effect” in the terms previously defined. 
 
Going into detail as regards the variables analysed, it can be seen how 
the business cycle, measured through the unemployment rate in the 
province, has no significant effect on how many cases are ruled in favour of 
workers. As regards the annual dummies, broadly speaking, a positive effect 
emerges with regard to how many cases are ruled in favour of workers 
related to the crisis years when compared to 2004 (year of reference), 
although said effect only proves significant in 2008, 2011 and 201219. The 
previously referred to labour reforms may also be making their presence felt 
here. 
 
As regards the characteristics of the province and cases dealt with, the 
following conclusions can also be drawn. First, composition by ages has no 
significant effects, although more cases are ruled in favour of workers when 
the industrial and construction sectors are involved to a greater degree. 
Finally, more cases are also ruled in favour of workers when the percentage 
of litigation handled increases in relation to the number of collective wage 
agreement disputes, and falls when the number of dismissal cases increases. 
 
  
                                                          
18 As already mentioned in the descriptive section, all the courts in which fewer than ten 
dismissal cases were handled were removed from the analysis to correct part of this effect. 
19This effect associated to the annual dummy variables is what might be leading to the 
unemployment rate’s lack of significance. 
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Table 2. Estimation of the percentage of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers. 
Treatment: Other judges, except replacement judges, are acting in the same court as 
incumbent judges. 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Treatment 0.096 0.046 0.083 0.089 0.090 0.001 0.099 0.000 
Unemployment 0.001 0.310 0.001 0.461 0.001 0.466 0.001 0.247 
2005 -0.006 0.728 -0.003 0.841 -0.005 0.738 -0.005 0.712 
2006 -0.030 0.082 -0.023 0.199 -0.028 0.091 -0.030 0.048 
2007 -0.006 0.730 0.000 0.995 -0.003 0.868 -0.005 0.754 
2008 0.028 0.087 0.036 0.034 0.035 0.041 0.031 0.045 
2009 0.000 0.998 -0.008 0.754 -0.007 0.757 0.003 0.902 
2010 0.011 0.686 0.027 0.342 0.024 0.349 0.015 0.513 
2011 0.036 0.151 0.049 0.054 0.046 0.076 0.040 0.092 
2012 0.047 0.141 0.062 0.048 0.061 0.047 0.051 0.070 
From 20 to 24 -1.292 0.224 -1.127 0.288 -1.231 0.240 -1.276 0.188 
From 25 to 54 -0.705 0.357 -0.741 0.328 -0.868 0.254 -0.839 0.232 
Over 55 -0.641 0.401 -0.629 0.406 -0.723 0.335 -0.705 0.309 
Construction 0.760 0.000 0.719 0.000 0.695 0.000 0.723 0.000 
Industry 0.267 0.001 0.275 0.001 0.247 0.003 0.257 0.001 
Agriculture -0.012 0.881 -0.010 0.898 -0.006 0.942 -0.002 0.978 
Collective wage 
agreement 
0.262 0.000 0.182 0.002 0.200 0.001 0.262 0.000 
Dismissals  -1.947 0.000 -1.933 0.000 -2.080 0.000 -2.070 0.000 
Payments -0.077 0.065 -0.068 0.097 -0.074 0.064 -0.085 0.023 
Constant 1.263 0.098 1.295 0.087 1.421 0.061 1.384 0.048 
R2 Adjusted 0.075 0.086 0.078 0.216 
Treatment 
 
Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Only one judge -0.972 0.012 -0.972 0.012 -1.071 0.026 -1.071 0.026 
No. of cases     -1.8E-04 0.728 -1.8E-04 0.728 
Different judge      0.656 0.015 0.656 0.015 
R2 Adjusted 0.159 0.159 0.219 0.219 
Spatial control  No No Si Si 
ATE 0.096 0.083 0.090 0.099 
ATET 0.096 0.093 0.098 0.084 
ATENT 0.096 0.079 0.086 0.106 
Source: Authors’ own based on data from the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary 
In models I, II and III, estimation is performed by probit-2sls , and in IV using the Heckman method   
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Table 3. Estimation of the percentage of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers. 
Treatment: Only replacement judges are acting in the same court as incumbent 
judges. 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Treatment 0.027 0.078 0.063 0.002 0.052 0.000 0.040 0.001 
Unemployment 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 
2005 -0.014 0.142 -0.014 0.175 -0.014 0.161 -0.014 0.148 
2006 -0.010 0.294 -0.005 0.610 -0.006 0.524 -0.008 0.405 
2007 -0.001 0.958 0.006 0.552 0.005 0.629 0.003 0.802 
2008 0.030 0.003 0.033 0.002 0.032 0.002 0.032 0.002 
2009 0.024 0.099 0.022 0.144 0.021 0.147 0.023 0.115 
2010 0.013 0.405 0.014 0.376 0.014 0.379 0.013 0.389 
2011 0.005 0.735 0.002 0.895 0.003 0.859 0.004 0.801 
2012 0.019 0.287 0.012 0.511 0.014 0.453 0.016 0.368 
From 20 to 24 0.349 0.651 0.146 0.855 0.226 0.771 0.277 0.715 
From 25 to 54 -0.160 0.778 -0.415 0.484 -0.322 0.566 -0.252 0.645 
Over 55 0.083 0.882 -0.100 0.863 -0.031 0.956 0.021 0.970 
Construction 0.418 0.001 0.336 0.012 0.347 0.008 0.381 0.003 
Industry 0.300 0.000 0.288 0.000 0.291 0.000 0.295 0.000 
Agriculture 0.051 0.419 0.069 0.286 0.063 0.317 0.058 0.352 
Collective wage 
agreements 
0.205 0.000 0.076 0.107 0.088 0.031 0.145 0.000 
Dismissals -1.370 0.000 -1.416 0.000 -1.407 0.000 -1.397 0.000 
Payments  -0.083 0.001 -0.080 0.002 -0.081 0.001 -0.081 0.001 
Constant 0.649 0.251 0.902 0.126 0.817 0.146 0.744 0.175 
R2 Adjusted 0.129 0.083 0.100 0.138 
Treatment 
 
Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Only one judge     -0.659 0.004 -0.659 0.004 
No. of cases     -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
Different judge 1.532 0.000 1.532 0.000 1.521 0.000 1.521 0.000 
R2 Adjusted 0.179 0.179 0.269 0.269 
Spatial control  No No Si Si 
ATE 0.027 0.060 0.052 0.040 
ATET 0.027 0.058 0.050 0.038 
ATENT 0.027 0.064 0.056 0.044 
Source: Authors’ own based on data from the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary. 
In models I, II and III, estimation is performed by probit-2sls, and in IV using the Heckman method. 
Malo, Martín-Román&Moral  
23 
 
With regard to how treatment is instrumented, it can be seen how the 
model improves (in terms of R2 adjusted) as the number of instruments 
increases. In general, a positive and significant effect of a change of judge in 
the court can be seen on the likelihood that other kinds of judges apart from 
replacement judges will be acting. Contrastingly, said likelihood is reduced in 
the case of provinces with only a single court. It can also be seen that the 
number of cases dealt with by incumbent judges has no significant effect and 
that including the regional variables proves important vis-à-vis a proper 
instrumentation of the treatment. When all the instruments are included, the 
adjusted R2 of the probit estimation of treatment increases from 0.16, when 
only one instrument is included, to 0.22 in the full model. 
 
The final point to be borne in mind concerns differentiating between 
the effect of treatment on those treated and on those not treated. For such a 
difference to exist, a specification needs to be made for heteroskedasticity. As 
a result, it can only be seen in models II, III and IV. Overall, no major 
differences are apparent between the effect observed on the courts treated 
and the expected effect in the case of those which are not. In models II and III, 
the effect on those treated is greater than on those not treated. However, in 
model IV, which offers the best fit, the opposite is true, and the effect on those 
not treated is greater than is actually observed in the courts when other 
judges are also acting. 
 
Table 3 displays the number of cases ruled in favour of workers when 
treatment involves replacement judges acting at the same time as incumbent 
judges in the same court. The key result stems from the coefficient associated 
to treatment. In this case, a positive and significant effect can be seen, ranging 
from the three points in model I, in which heteroskedasticity is not corrected, 
to the six points in model II, which does correct for heteroskedasticity and 
uses only a single instrument. This means around 8.5% on the mean 
likelihood of upholding cases and again amply exceeds the difference 
observed from the descriptive standpoint. As a result, there is a positive 
effect on the percentage of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers by 
incumbent judges which seems to be sparked by the presence of replacement 
judges acting in the same court. Further, it can also be seen that this effect is 
lower than when there are other judges who are not replacement judges. In 
this case, it may be concluded that, in line with the terminology presented in 
the introduction, there is quite a considerable “quasi-peer effect” . 
 
Differences are also in evidence in the results linked to the 
explanatory variables. Firstly, a positive and significant effect of the 
provincial unemployment rate is evident, indicating that the percentage of 
dismissal cases rises during downturns in the business cycle. Nevertheless, 
the annual variables now lose significance, with only 2008 displaying a 
positive and significant effect when compared to 2004. As regards the 
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features of the population, it can again be seen that the composition of the 
various age groups in each province does not prove important but that the 
sectoral composition does. The percentage of dismissal cases ruled in favour 
of workers by incumbent judges rises when the weight of the industrial and 
construction sector increases. Finally, and with regard to the composition of 
the cases dealt with in court, the percentage of cases ruled in favour of 
workers is seen to rise if the weight of cases concerning collective wage 
agreements increases, and falls if there is a greater weight of dismissal cases. 
 
The second block deals with treatment instrumentation. As with the 
previous case, two models with a single instrument are used together with a 
further two with the full structure of instruments. Broadly speaking, a 
positive and significant effect can be seen in the change of judge on the 
likelihood that replacement judges will be acting in the same court. It can also 
be seen that having a province with only a single court and where there are 
few cases dealt with reduces the likelihood of treatment. Finally, regional 
variables are seen to improve the specification of treatment and the full 
model is seen to improve the fit from 0.18 in the model with a single 
instrument to 0.27 in the full model. 
 
Finally, small variations are also apparent in this case between the 
effect of treatment on those treated and those not treated, although they all 
point in the same direction20. Specifically, it can be seen that the effect of 
treatment in the case of courts with replacement judges is slightly lower than 
would be expected if replacement judges were to be included in the courts 
where they are not participating. 
 
To conclude this first part of the results, Figure 3 and Figure 4 are 
shown, representing the Kernel associated to the decomposition of the effect 
of treatment in the two cases studied. The aim is to determine whether there 
are any differences in the distributions of the effects of treatment and when 
decomposed for the group of treated and non-treated. For this 
representation, estimation of the probit-2SLS with control for 
heteroskedasticity and full instrumentation (model III) was used. The reason 
underlying this choice is based on the developments presented by Cerulli 
(2014). We repeated the calculations with the four estimation methods and 
in two of them this structure re-appeared. 
 
                                                          
20 Except in the case of module I where there was no control for heteroskedasticity and, 
therefore, the effect is identical on treated and non-treated. 
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Figure 3. Kernel of ATE, ATET and ATENT for the percentage of cases ruled in favour 
of workers (model III). Treatment: Other judges (not replacement) acting in the same 
court as incumbent judges 
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Figure 4. Kernel of ATE, ATET and ATENT for the percentage of dismissal cases ruled 
in favour of workers (model III). Treatment: Replacement and incumbent judges 
sharing a court. 
 
Source: Authors’ own 
A very similar distribution may be deduced from the two figures for 
the three effects and the two treatments. However, more noticeable 
differences are in evidence when treatment involves non-replacement judges 
in the same court. In this case, the greatest mean effect on those treated is 
accounted for by a greater presence of courts where this effect is substantial 
and which is reflected in the peak observed, with values approaching 13%. 
When treatment involves the presence of replacement judges, the 
distribution is virtually identical in the three cases. 
 
6.2. Robustness Analysis 
The final part of the econometric analysis involves using a robustness 
analysis to check the sensitivity of the results obtained. With this goal in 
mind, two different approaches are followed: first a bootstrap analysis is 
conducted to determine whether the decomposition of the effects of 
treatment is significant and whether said effects change for random sub-
samples, and secondly, the estimations are repeated (applying the more 
complete model) using the program implemented in STATA to gauge the 
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Table 4. Bootstrap Analysis of ATET and ATENT in terms of type of treatment and 
estimated model. 
  Treatment 
  
Another judge Replacements 
Model 
 
Coefficient P>z Coefficient P>z 
I 
ATET 0.096 0.179 0.027 0.064 
ATENT 0.096 0.179 0.027 0.064 
II 
ATET 0.093 0.260 0.058 0.001 
ATENT 0.079 0.367 0.064 0.000 
III 
ATET 0.098 0.004 0.050 0.000 
ATENT 0.086 0.015 0.056 0.000 
IV 
ATET 0.084 0.010 0.038 0.005 
ATENT 0.106 0.001 0.044 0.001 
Source: Authors’ own.  
N.B.: The results shown in Table 4 have been carried out with 100 iterations. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of bootstrap analysis on the effects of the 
two treatments, both on treated as well as non-treated. The analysis shown in 
the table has been carried out using 100 iterations21. As can be seen, there 
are no major changes in the values observed in Tables 2 and 3, thus 
indicating the results are robust. Overall, it can be seen that the 
decomposition in the more comprehensive models is significant for the two 
treatments and that the effects are noticeably greater in cases when judges 
other than replacement judges are acting in the same court. When 
replacement judges are not acting, it is not clear whether the effect is greater 
on those treated or on those not treated, although the size of the aggregate 
effect remains the same. Nevertheless, the effect of replacement judges acting 
is always greater on the group of non-treated. 
 
The final part of the robustness analysis repeats the estimations 
carried out using maximum likelihood methods of a linear model augmented 
with a specification of treatment which enables endogeneity to be corrected. 
This method is the one which appears in STATA 13 for the case of continuous 
variables that are not count variables. The estimations performed are 
displayed in Table 5 which presents two results for each treatment. In all 
cases, the more complete specification method is used (the one 
corresponding to models III and IV) with the following consideration. Only 
the second specification in each treatment uses interaction variables. These 
variables are assumed to have a different effect on the group of treated and 
non-treated. Thus, in the second specification of each treatment, a distinction 
emerges between the mean effect of treatment and the effect of treatment on 
those treated (STATA does not provide the effect on those not treated). 
                                                          
21 The analysis was also repeated with 500 iterations and the results were identical 
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The results obtained are very similar to those presented in Tables 2 
and 3, again bearing out the robustness of our results. In all the estimations, 
the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of non-correlation between the 
errors of treatment and those of the target variable. Again, there is a greater 
positive and significant effect of treatment when those sharing the court are 
not replacement judges. The data concerning most of the variables are also 
repeated. The only different results to be seen are that the percentage of 
dismissal cases dealt with out of the total changes its effect, and that the 
number of cases handled in a court has a positive effect on the possibility that 
there might be judges other than replacement judges acting in the same 
court. The conclusions with regard to the effects of treatment are also similar 
although their size increases somewhat. Sharing a court with a replacement 
judge increases the percentage of cases ruled in favour of workers by seven 
points (a 10% increase on the observed mean). However, if the court is 
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Table 5. Results of estimating the percentage of dismissal cases ruled in favour of 
workers in terms of treatment and specification. 
 Other judges Replacement judges 
 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Treatment 0.123 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.041 0.003 0.087 0.000 
Unemployment 0.001 0.294 0.001 0.183 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 
2005 0.006 0.685 0.005 0.753 -0.015 0.115 -0.016 0.097 
2006 -0.013 0.340 -0.013 0.389 -0.012 0.226 -0.011 0.273 
2007 0.003 0.828 0.003 0.848 -0.001 0.917 0.001 0.937 
2008 0.034 0.023 0.030 0.082 0.030 0.003 0.026 0.013 
2009 0.035 0.071 0.030 0.136 0.025 0.075 0.015 0.289 
2010 0.050 0.017 0.042 0.047 0.014 0.366 0.010 0.527 
2011 0.044 0.060 0.037 0.122 0.007 0.628 0.005 0.767 
2012 0.048 0.079 0.040 0.163 0.021 0.235 0.018 0.304 
From 20 to 24 -1.099 0.234 -0.987 0.311 0.264 0.726 0.135 0.864 
From 25 to 54 -0.638 0.348 -0.564 0.406 -0.278 0.611 -0.483 0.381 
Over 55 -0.498 0.462 -0.349 0.616 -0.017 0.975 -0.078 0.889 
Construction 0.547 0.001 0.577 0.003 0.396 0.002 0.367 0.009 
Industry 0.271 0.001 0.272 0.001 0.285 0.000 0.243 0.000 
Agriculture 0.073 0.341 0.050 0.565 0.058 0.352 0.060 0.287 
Collective wage 
agreement s 
-1.613 0.000 -1.569 0.000 -1.383 0.000 -1.353 0.000 
Dismissals 0.249 0.000 0.173 0.009 0.196 0.000 0.018 0.711 
Payments -0.077 0.032 -0.077 0.041 -0.082 0.001 -0.081 0.002 
Constant 1.178 0.082 1.077 0.115 0.756 0.168 0.907 0.102 
Treatment 
 
Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z 
Only one judge -1.205 0.002 -1.240 0.000 -0.742 0.000 -0.759 0.000 
No. of cases 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.030 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
Different judge 0.705 0.000 0.662 0.006 1.478 0.000 1.384 0.000 
Spatial control  Si Si Si Si 
ATE  0.120  0.073 
ATET  0.119  0.074 
Source: Authors’ own based on data from the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary 
In the second specification of each treatment, interaction variables are used (these variables are those 
used to correct heteroskedasticity in models II, III and IV of the previous estimations  





The present work seeks to identify the effect which acting at the same time as 
other types of judge might have on the percentage of dismissal cases ruled in 
favour of workers by incumbent judges. In this regard, the study aims to 
distinguish depending on the various kinds of judge acting in the same court 
and has pinpointed two different effects. First, there is the so-called “peer 
effect”, the effect caused by judges other than replacement judges acting in 
the court. These tend to be professional judges and might be acting at the 
same time as the incumbent judge. Second, there is the so-called “quasi-peer 
effect”, an effect which occurs when replacement judges act in the same court 
but do not deal with cases at the same time as the incumbent judge. 
 
From a descriptive standpoint, the existence of the two effects is 
clearly evident. Specifically, more dismissal cases are ruled in favour of 
workers by incumbent judges when they are sharing their court, said effect 
being greater when they can combine their work and when they share courts 
with other judges who are not replacement judges. Nevertheless, this first 
observation might be influenced by many other factors linked to the features 
of the area in question, the nature of the litigation involved, or the court itself. 
It would even seem logical to assume that there are unobservable reasons 
which might at the same time be influencing the fact that judges are sharing a 
court with other judges and the number of cases being ruled in favour of 
workers.  
 
In order to deal with all of these issues, treatment analysis techniques 
are used wherein the effects of endogeneity are corrected and where two 
different types of treatment are applied: one analysing the effect of having 
only replacement judges sharing the court with incumbent judges, and 
another when there are other kinds of judges.  
 
The explanatory variables included in the model indicate that the 
number of cases ruled in favour of workers is influenced by the productive 
structure of each area, and increases when the weight of the industrial and 
construction sector is greater. A certain sensitivity to the business cycle and 
to labour reforms is also in evidence and is reflected in a higher number of 
cases being ruled in favour of workers in the latter years of the sample. As 
regards treatment, it may also be concluded that sharing a court is not a 
random factor but is shaped by the features of the court itself, such as size (in 
terms of the number of cases handled in each court or the need for there to 
be more than one in each province) or the likelihood of there being changes 
in the court. 
 
With regard to the central variable in the work which measures the 
effect of treatment, the results in terms of the number of cases ruled in favour 
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of workers and vis-à-vis the robustness analysis would seem to confirm a 
positive and significant effect on the number of dismissal cases ruled in 
favour of workers when incumbent judges are not acting alone. Firstly, the 
existence of the so-called “peer effect” is confirmed, reflected in a greater 
percentage of dismissal cases being ruled in favour of workers when 
incumbent judges act at the same time as other judges who are not 
replacement judges and which is higher than is observed from the 
descriptive standpoint. Secondly, the existence of the so-called “quasi-peer 
effect” is also evident, this also proving to be both positive and significant, 
although less than the previous effect, and whose origin lies in incumbent 
and replacement judges sharing the same court. 
 
The existence of “peer effects” confirms the significant impact of 
incumbent judges having other colleagues acting at the same time and the 
influences this has on the decisions taken. For their part, “quasi-peer effects” 
would seem to indicate there might be choices being made when judges 
determine which cases to take and might even point to problems of 
information linked to more than one judge having examined the same case. 
Another possible explanation which could be posited to account for “quasi-
peer effects” might relate to the quality of the rulings issued being linked to 
the type of judge. In order to confirm this, an analysis was carried out of the 
percentage of cases which were ratified in higher courts. No major 
differences were found between courts, regardless of whether only 
incumbent judges had sat or whether they had been sharing their court with 
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